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PROFIT-MOTIVATED POLICE CRIME
To Protect and Collect: A Nationwide Study of Profit-Motivated Police Crime
Abstract
This study is part of a larger research project on police crime in the United States. Police
crimes are those criminal offenses committed by sworn law enforcement officers who have the
general powers of arrest. Profit-motivated police crime involves officers who use their authority
of position to engage in crime for personal gain. This study reports the findings on 1,591 cases
where a law enforcement officer was arrested for one or more profit-motivated crimes during the
seven-year period 2005-2011. The profit-motivated arrest cases involved 1,396 individual
officers employed by 782 state, local, special, constable, and tribal law enforcement agencies
located in 531 counties and independent cities in 47 states and the District of Columbia. Our
data is the first systematic study of profit-motivated police crime. The study describes the nature
of this form of police misconduct in terms of several dimensions, including the characteristics of
police who perpetrate these crimes, where it occurs, the specific criminal charges, and the
contexts within which profit-motivated police crime is punished through police agencies and the
criminal courts.

Keywords: police crime, police corruption, police misconduct, profit-motivated police crime
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To Protect and Collect: A Nationwide Study of Profit-Motivated Police Crime
American policing seems to confront an inflection point both historically and within the
present context of crisis. A series of notorious police-citizen encounters have stoked anti-police
sentiment and undermined police legitimacy in some communities: Ferguson (MO) and the
shooting of Michael Brown; Baltimore (MD) and the in-custody death of Freddie Gray; Chicago
(IL) and the shooting of LaQuan McDonald. Whether one views these cases as legitimate or
excessive, the resulting protests and civil unrest demonstrate tenuous police-community relations
and eroded public confidence in police (Liederbach, 2016). The current crisis provides an
obvious context for any contemporary empirical study on police misconduct, corruption, and/or
crime, particularly those that present new data. Unlike the high-profile cases above, most
instances of police misconduct never come to the attention of the public or prosecutors, and there
are no comprehensive statistics on the nature and prevalence of these phenomena. The mending
of fences between police and community depends to a large degree on empirical data that
describes various forms of police misconduct and parallel efforts to utilize the data as an avenue
towards increased transparency, accountability, and ultimately the improvement of policing.
One complicating factor in the study of police misconduct relates to variety and the range
of acts that have been loosely defined under this rubric. Police misconduct arises from an
assortment of motivations, with considerable variation within each type or category. Many but
not all forms involve abuse of police authority, though it is important to bear in mind the
distinction between crimes facilitated or abetted by that authority, and crimes committed under
circumstances where the police authority is irrelevant. For the former, there is a basic division
anchored in the officer’s motivation.
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The first motivation has been termed “noble cause corruption” in which bad things are
done to advance good ends (Caldero & Crank, 2004). Perjury and “testilying” to obtain the
conviction of criminal defendants is one example (Dershowitz, 1994a, 1994b). Conducting
warrantless searches to confiscate and destroy drugs or weapons from known criminals (when
legal grounds to do so are not available) is another form, ostensibly justified by “protection of
the community.” These examples involve the application of police authority outside the formal
rules, but for the presumed benefit of society rather than for the individual officers.
The second motivation involves some kind of personal gain, whether it be personal
gratification that is solely psychological, or criminal procurement of financial gain.
Psychological benefits may be sexual gratification (e.g., strip-searching citizens without
justification), and may range as far as sadism. Other forms of this type of misconduct may
involve an assertion of racist, homophobic, or other social views, denigrating or humiliating
individuals without legal justification. In such cases, the police authority serves as the backdrop
to the imposition of a personally-held, illegitimate “moral” order not recognized by the law or
society.
This paper addresses an element of the second motivation, the use of police authority for
personal enrichment. Fyfe and Kane (2006) coined the term "profit-motivated" police
misconduct to describe a variety of corrupt and/or illegal "money-making" behaviors that had
connections of varying strength to the perpetrator's employment as a police officer (p. xiv).
Historically, financial corruption was institutional rather than individual, as the history of “The
Pad” in New York City demonstrates (see, e.g., Knapp Commission, 1972). The line between
pro-social and personal motives is readily permeable as illegal activities to undermine a drug
mob can quickly morph into for-profit criminal activities on the “Prince of the City” model (see
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Daley, 1978). News media accounts of police officers arrested for profit-motivated crimes more
specifically demonstrate the substance of our research: police arrested for embezzlement to
support a gambling addiction, or the acceptance of bribes in exchange for political favors (see,
e.g., Associated Press, 2006a; Parrish, 2007); police arrested for theft of illegal drugs, or
participation in large-scale trafficking operations (see, e.g., Associated Press, 2006b; The Seattle
Times, 2009); police arrested for repeated burglaries of homes and commercial business; and,
police arrested for robberies and the shakedown of drug dealers involving hundreds of pounds of
marijuana and dozens of kilos of cocaine (see, e.g., Glover, 2008; Lakin, 2007). Some accounts
of profit-motivated police crime seem more far-fetched, such as cases where police were arrested
for stealing from accounts designated for the DARE program or a "kids and cops" Christmas
fund (see, e.g., Colquhoun, 2006; The State Journal-Register, 2013). These cases are not morally
ambiguous, nor do they involve policies and/or officers that merely push ethical boundaries.
These are police who were arrested based on probable cause that they had engaged in illegal
money-making criminal offenses for personal profit.
The current study extends the existing and considerable line of research regarding various
forms of police misconduct by focusing on particular forms of profit-motivated police crimes.
More specifically, the data describe the nature of profit-motivated police crime in terms of who
commits it, where it occurs, and the criminal offenses charged in these types of cases. The study
also describes how this sort of police misconduct is recognized and punished (or not) by police
organizations and criminal courts. These data are important because they augment existing
studies on the topic. This is the only study known to systematically describe a large sample of
profit-motivated police crimes as they occur within state and local law enforcement agencies
across the United States. The next section provides a review of the relevant scholarship. The
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review locates the perpetration of profit-motivated police crime within historical and
occupational contexts, and describes the few empirical studies in which these sorts of police
behaviors have been conceptualized and previously identified and studied.
Profit-Motivated Police Crime: Conceptualization & Data
Much of the crime committed by police officers historically has been viewed in the
context of corruption. The Knapp Commission (1972) identified bad cops in New York City as
“grass eaters” who engaged in petty acts of corruption, and “meat eaters” who were deeply
involved in organized police corruption. The Mollen Commission (1994) found that greed is the
primary motive behind police crime that constitutes corruption. This is true if police corruption
is conceptualized in the traditional context of acts such as accepting bribes to refrain from law
enforcement. It is, however, “less clear whether officers who perform robberies or burglaries,
shoplift, sell drugs, or engage in welfare or insurance fraud during their off-duty time are
engaging in a variety of police corruption” (Fyfe & Kane, 2006, p. xv). Fyfe and Kane (2006)
re-conceptualized these actions as “profit-motivated" misconduct and noted that “police
corruption is not as easy to define as we formerly may have believed” (p. xv). Similarly, Carter
(1990, pp. 89–90) conceptualized police corruption as being characterized by a “profit-driven
cycle.” The classification of some police crime as profit-motivated is also found in Ross’ (2001)
taxonomy of police crime, where the second of four dichotomous distinctions is between
“economically-motivated and non-economically-motivated police behavior” (p. 184).
Theories on the subculture of police deviance can be used to explain the occurrence of
profit-motivated police crime. Subculture theories provide rationale and attempt to explain
factors that might prompt some police officers to commit a crime, including those of the moneymaking variety. Westley (1956) and Stoddard (1968) posited that there is an informal code in
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policing that dictates how most sworn law enforcement officers behave in their dealings with
each other. This is consistent with Vollmer’s observation that in many police departments it is
an unwritten rule that officers never testify against another officer (Wickersham Commission,
1931). Key (1935) noted that police graft in the 1930s was facilitated by a rule of silence among
police officers. Similarly, Westley’s (1956, 1970) research in the 1950s found that a code of
secrecy existed in police departments that was used to shield against outsiders, creating an "us
versus them" mentality for most police officers. Building on the concept of an informal social
code within policing, Stoddard (1968) hypothesized that police recruits are socialized into an
informal but unlawful code of secrecy that perpetuates as a process of group deviation into
illegal behaviors. Stoddard called this process blue-coat crime, which he defined as a
“functioning informal social system whose norms and practices are at variance with legal
statutes” commonly referred to by police officers simply as “the code” (Stoddard, 1968, p. 201).
Stoddard listed a variety of practices under the code that are crimes, including shopping (i.e.,
stealing from businesses after hours), extortion, bribery, shakedown, perjury, and premeditated
theft. Thus, theories on police subculture explain how officers and law enforcement
organizations collectively fail to provide formal and informal controls to mitigate money-making
misconduct.
The occupational environment of police work can be used to explain the occurrence of
profit-motivated police crime beyond collective secrecy and deviant subcultural norms.
Instances of police misconduct have been traditionally described as "hidden" behaviors that are
likely to go unreported; and hence, difficult to identify and mitigate. Police scholars often
underscore how opportunities for corruption, misconduct, and crime derive directly from the law
enforcement work environment (see, e.g., Goldstein, 1977; Kappeler, Sluder, & Alpert, 1998).
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These opportunities abound within the context of police work. Police commonly patrol alone
and largely free from any direct supervision. Police-citizen interactions often occur in the latenight hours that provide low public visibility. Police often encounter citizens who are themselves
law-breakers, vulnerable, and/or commonly assumed to be not credible as potential
complainants. These realities show how it is possible for deviant police officers to engage in
illegal money-making activities including the shakedown of drug dealers, thefts from homes and
businesses known to lack capable guardianship, or the embezzlement of funds from accounts
wherein police officers act as fiduciaries because they are generally presumed to be trustworthy.
A small number of empirical studies provide data on the profit-motivated deviance and
crimes perpetrated by police. Kane and White (2013) explored the nature of the career-ending
police misconduct in the NYPD and found that the profit-motivated cases (N = 387) included
bribe-taking (18.6%), grand larceny (17.1%), insurance fraud (8.6%), burglary (7.3%), petit
larceny (7.3%), receiving stolen property (3.9%), government fraud (3.1%), gratuities (2.6%),
gambling (1.8%), illegal operation (1.8%), and other profit-motivated misconduct (27.4%) such
as extortion, robbery, or abusing official resources (p. 73, Table 4.2).
More recently, Stinson and colleagues found that profit-motivated police crime is a
quantifiable variable that helps explains the nature of police crime across the life course of
officers’ law enforcement careers in a variety of contexts at nonfederal law enforcement agencies
throughout the United States. Whereas less experienced police officers are more likely to
commit violent crimes, those officers who commit profit-motivated crimes are more likely to be
experienced officers late in their policing career and more likely to be supervisors and/or
administrators (Stinson, Liederbach, & Freiburger, 2010). Likewise, crime by policewomen is
most often profit-motivated (Stinson, Todak, & Dodge, 2015). Crime by school resource
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officers typically is not profit-motivated police crime (Stinson & Watkins, 2014). Profitmotivated police crimes are more likely to be committed while officers are on-duty and less
likely to be committed while an officer is off-duty (Stinson, Liederbach, & Freiburger, 2012).
The current study identifies, describes, and analyzes almost 1,600 actual cases where
sworn law enforcement officers from nonfederal agencies across the United States were arrested
for one or more profit-motivated police crimes. The purpose of this paper is to provide an
overview of profit-motivated police crime arrests and to determine predictors of an officer being
convicted in one of these cases. The next section provides an overview of the methodology
employed in this quantitative content analysis research study.
Method
This study is part of a larger research project on police crime designed to locate cases in
which nonfederal sworn law enforcement officers were arrested for any type of crime(s). Police
crimes are those criminal offenses committed by sworn law enforcement officers who have the
general powers of arrest. Data were culled from news articles published on the internet using the
Google News search engine and the automated Google Alerts email update service. Google
Alerts searches were set up using the 48 search terms developed by Stinson (2009). The Google
Alerts email update service constantly crawled the Google News search engine on each of the 48
search terms. An email message was sent each time one of the automated daily searches of the
Google News search engine identified a news article that matched any of the search terms. The
email alerts contained a link to the uniform resource locator (URL) for the identified new
articles. The news articles were located, examined for relevancy, printed, logged, and then
scanned into digital images, indexed, and archived in an object-relational project database for
subsequent coding and content analysis. Whenever possible, additional news articles and court
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records were subsequently located by research assistants and added to the database. This study
focused on the identification, description, and analysis of the cases in which sworn law
enforcement officers were arrested for one or more profit-motivated crimes during the calendar
years 2005-2011. Profit-motivated police crime involves sworn officers who use the authority of
their position to engage in crime for personal economic gain.
Coding and Content Analysis
Content analyses were conducted in order to code the cases in terms of (a) arrested
officer, (b) employing agency, (c) charged criminal offense(s), (d) victim characteristics, (e) type
of police crime, (f) adverse employment outcomes, and (g) criminal case dispositions. The data
collection guidelines of the National Incident-Based Reporting System (NIBRS) was used as the
coding protocol for each criminal offense (see U.S. Department of Justice, 2000). Fifty-seven
criminal offenses are included in the NIBRS, consisting of 46 incident-based criminal offenses in
one of 22 crime categories, as well as 11 additional arrest-based minor criminal offense
categories. An additional eight offenses were added following an earlier pilot study (see Stinson,
2009) because police officers who were arrested often were charged with criminal offenses not
included in the NIBRS (e.g., online solicitation of a child, indecent exposure, official misconduct
/ official oppression / violation of oath, vehicular hit-and-run, perjury / false reports / false
statements, criminal deprivation of civil rights). In each case every offense charged was
recorded on the coding instrument as well as the most serious offense charged in each police
crime arrest case. The most serious offense charged was determined using the Uniform Crime
Report’s (UCR) crime seriousness hierarchy (see U.S. Department of Justice, 2004).
The primary unit of analysis in this study was criminal arrest case. This provided the
opportunity to differentiate between officers’ crimes with multiple victims and officers who were
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arrested on multiple occasions within the study years 2005-2011. By coding each arrest case
separately, the criminal case dispositions in each case as well as the adverse employment actions
attached to each arrest case could be documented for analysis. Cases were also coded on
Stinson’s (2009, 2015) typology of police crime, which posits that most crime committed by
police officers is alcohol-related, drug-related, sex-related, violence-related, and/or profitmotivated. These types of police crime are not mutually-exclusive categories, and so each type
of police crime was coded as a dichotomous variable because crimes committed by officers often
involve more than one type of police crime. Cases were also coded on numerous variables
relating to drug-related police crimes and drugs of abuse (see Stinson et al., 2013).
Secondary data were employed from the Census of State and Local Law Enforcement
Agencies (CSLLEA) (U.S. Department of Justice, 2008) to ascertain demographic data including
the number of full-time sworn personnel and part-time sworn personnel employed by each
agency where arrested officers served. Fifteen agencies included in this study were not listed in
the 2008 wave of the CSLLEA. County and independent city five-digit Federal Information
Processing Standards (FIPS) identifier numbers (see U.S. Census Bureau, 2010) were used to
verify location of arrested officers’ employing law enforcement agencies, as well as for use as a
key variable to merge other data sources into the project’s master database and data set. The
U.S. Department of Agriculture’s (2003) county-level urban to rural nine-point continuum scale
was used to measure rurality with population data from the U.S. Census Bureau’s decennial
census in year 2000 for county, independent city, and state populations.
Reliability
Analytic procedures were undertaken to ensure reliability of the data. An additional
coder was employed to independently code a random sample of five percent of the total number
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of cases in the larger study. Intercoder reliability was assessed by calculating the Krippendorf’s
alpha coefficient across 195 variables of interest in this study on a random sample (n = 290,
4.3%) of the cases in the study (N = 6,724) (see Hayes & Krippendorff, 2007). Krippendorf’s
alpha is often recognized as the standard reliability statistic for content analysis research (Riffe,
Lacy, & Fico, 2005). The Krippendorf’s alpha coefficient (Krippendorf’s α = .9153) is strong
across the variables in this study, indicating a high level of intercoder reliability (see
Krippendorff, 2013).
Statistical Analysis
Chi Square was used to measure the statistical significance of the association between
two variables measured at the nominal level. Cramer’s V measured the strength of that
relationship with values that range from zero to 1.0 and allows for an “assessment of the actual
importance of the relationship” (Riffe et al., 2005, p. 191). Stepwise binary logistic regression
was used to determine which of the predictor variables were statistically significant in
multivariate models. Stepwise logistic regression models are appropriate where the study is
purely exploratory and predictive (Menard, 2002). This is an exploratory study because little is
known empirically about profit-motivated crimes committed by sworn officers at nonfederal law
enforcement agencies across the United States. Summary statistics are also reported for
evaluation of regression diagnostics and each regression model.
This study utilized the Classification and Regression Trees (CART) decision tree
predictive analytic algorithm as a statistical technique to uncover the causal pathways between
independent predictors of officers arrested for one or more profit-motivated crimes and
conviction on any criminal offense charged. Although there are other predictive modeling
algorithms, we used CART because it fit our problem and produced an optimal decision tree by
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minimizing the generalization error (see, e.g., Rokach & Maimon, 2005, p. 167). CART is a
classification procedure that produces a binary decision tree and restricts partitioning at each
node to two nodes, thus producing binary splits for each child node (Dension, Mallick, & Smith,
1998). A node represents points at which the algorithm has to make a choice of possible
alternatives. A decision is made at each node, thus creating a child node or a terminal node. A
child node is the result of the algorithm splitting the data into subgroups whereas a terminal node
is finalized and no longer partitioned. The process is applied recursively until the tree is
completed. Breiman, Friedman, Olshen, and Stone’s (1984) CART algorithm uses an extensive
and exhaustive search of all possible univariate splits to determine the splitting of the data for the
classification tree. Partitioning will continue until the algorithm is unable to produce mutually
exclusive and homogenous groups (De’ath & Fabricius, 2000; Dension et al., 1998). After
creating an exhaustive tree, CART will prune nodes that do not significantly contribute to overall
prediction.
The predictive power of logistic regression and classification tree models was assessed
through the Area Under the Curve (AUC) component of the Receiver Operating Characteristic
(ROC). The AUC assesses the predictive accuracy of a statistical model and serves as the
preferred method for assessing and comparing models (Bewick, Cheek, & Ball, 2004; Dolan &
Doyle, 2000). The ROC curve considers the sensitivity versus 1- specificity, a representation of
the true positive rate (TPR) versus the false positive rate (FPR). The curve is displayed
graphically by plotting the TFP on the y-axis and the FPR on the x-axis. ROC curves are
interpreted through the AUC, a score that ranges from zero to one. A straight line through a
ROC curve is the equivalent of 0.5 and suggests that the model is no better at prediction than
flipping a coin. A score of one indicates that the model is able to accurately predict all cases.
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The AUC is interpreted as a proportional reduction of error (PRE) measure of explained
2
variation by calculating RROC
 2( AUC  .5) (Menard, 2010).

Strengths and Limitations
The news search methodology utilizing the Google News search engine and the Google
Alerts email update service provided an unparalleled amount of information on profit-motivated
police crime across the United States. The Google News search engine algorithm offers some
clear advantages over other aggregated news databases and the methodologies employed by
previous studies. The Google Alerts email update service provides the ability to run persistent
automated queries of the Google News search engine and deliver real-time search results. The
Google News search engine draws content from more than 50,000 news sources (Bharat, 2012)
and allows for access to a larger number of police misconduct cases than would be available
through other methods (Payne, 2013).
There are four primary limitations of the data. First, the data were limited only to cases
that involved an official arrest based on probable cause for one or more crimes. We do not
report any data on the alleged criminal behavior of police who were not arrested. Second, our
research was limited by the content and quality of information provided for each case. The
amount of information available on each case varied, and data for several variables of interest
were missing for some of the cases. Third, this research study included every case known to the
research team of a nonfederal sworn law enforcement officer who was arrested during the years
2005-2011. Thus, we do not purport to include every single instance of a law enforcement
officer being arrested for a profit-motivated crime. Finally, we recognize that these data were
the result of a filtering process that includes the exercise of discretion by media sources in terms
of both the types of stories covered and the nature of the content devoted to particular stories
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(Carlson, 2007). Ready, White, and Fisher (2008), however, found that news coverage of officer
misconduct is consistent with official police records of these events. Research also suggests that
police agencies are not especially effective at controlling media accounts of officer misconduct
(Chermak, McGarrell, & Gruenewald, 2006). Despite the noted limitations, the use of news
articles as the primary data source is a long established method of analyzing police misconduct
(see, e.g., Kraska & Kappeler, 1995; Lawrence, 2000; Lersch & Feagin, 1996; Rabe-Hemp &
Braithwaite, 2013; Ross, 2000; Stinson et al., 2010).
Results
There were 1,591 cases in the data set in which sworn nonfederal law enforcement
officers were arrested for profit-motivated crimes during the period January 1, 2005, through
December 31, 2011. The profit-motivated arrest cases involved 1,396 individual officers
employed by 782 state, local, special, constable, and tribal law enforcement agencies located in
531 counties and independent cities in 47 states and the District of Columbia (all states except
Idaho, Maine, and North Dakota). Of these 1,396 officers who were arrested for profitmotivated crimes, 94 of the arrested officers had more than one case ( X = 1.14, Mdn = 1.00,
Mode = 1, SD = .808) because they had more than one crime victim (one criminal case per crime
victim) and/or were arrested for a profit-motivated crime on more than one occasion during the
study years 2005-2011. More than two-thirds of the profit-motivated criminal cases involved an
arrested officer who is known to have lost his or her job (n = 1,080, 67.9%). The known final
adverse employment outcomes in these cases include no action against the arrested officer (n =
135, 8.5%), suspended (n = 376, 23.6%), voluntarily resigned (n = 503, 31.6%), and
involuntarily terminated (n = 577, 36.3%). More than half of the profit-motivated arrest cases
resulted in a conviction (n = 914, 57.4%) on one or more offenses charged in the case.
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Officers Arrested for Profit-motivated Police Crime, Offenses & Employing Agencies
Table 1 presents descriptive information on the profit-motivated police crime arrest cases
in terms of the arrested officer and the offenses charged, as well as information on the employing
law enforcement agency and the arresting law enforcement agency. Most of the profit-motivated
arrest cases involved male officers (n = 1,497, 94.1%). The modal category for known officer
age at time of arrest was ages 36-39 (n = 244, 15.3%). The youngest officer arrested for a profitmotivated police crime was 20 years old at time of arrest, and the oldest was 79 years old ( X
age = 38.01, Mdn age = 37,00, Mode age = 41, SD = 9.097 years). The modal category for
known years of service as a sworn law enforcement officer at time of arrest was 3-5 years (n =
197, 12.4%) ( X years of service = 10.90, Mdn years of service = 10.00, Mode years of service =
4, SD = 7.808 years). More than one-fifth of the arrest cases (n = 234, 20.8%) where years of
service at time of arrest was known involve an arrested officer with 18 or more years of service.
<<<< Insert Table 1 about here >>>>>
Most of the profit-motivated police crime arrest cases involved sworn officers in patrol
and street-level ranks, including nonsupervisory officers, deputies, troopers, and detectives (n =
1,243, 78.1%). Other profit-motivated police crime arrest cases included mid-rank line and field
supervisors (n = 208, 13.1%) and high-ranking police managers and executives (n = 140, 8.8%).
More than two-thirds of the profit-motivated arrest cases involved crimes that were committed
while on-duty (n = 1,093, 68.7%). Even so, two-thirds of the cases (n = 1,081, 67.9%) involved
an arrest made by some law enforcement agency other than the agency employing the arrested
officer.
Some of the profit-motivated arrest cases also involved drug-related (n = 438, 27.5%),
violence-related (n = 164, 10.3%), sex-related (n = 29, 1.8%), and/or alcohol-related (n = 16,

PROFIT-MOTIVATED POLICE CRIME

15

1.0%) crimes. Many of the profit-motivated arrest cases involved crimes that were committed by
sworn law enforcement officers acting in their official capacity (n = 1,141, 71.7%).
Most of the profit-motivated police crime arrest cases involved officers employed by
municipal police departments (n = 1,162, 73.0%) or sheriff’s offices (n = 251, 15.8%). The
arrest cases also involved officers who were employed by primary state police agencies (n = 62,
3.9%), county police departments (n = 66, 4.2%), special police departments (n = 42, 2.6%),
constable agencies (n = 7, 0.4%), and tribal police departments (n = 1, 0.1%). The modal
category for size of the employing law enforcement agency by the number of full-time sworn
officers employed was 1,000 or more full-time sworn officers (n = 495, 31.1%) and zero parttime sworn officers (n = 1,209, 76.1%). The majority of officers arrested in profit-motivated
police crime arrest cases were employed by a nonfederal law enforcement agency located in a
nonrural metropolitan county or independent city (n = 1,312, 82.5%). The employing agencies
were located throughout the United States, including agencies in the Southern states (n = 726,
45.6%), Northeastern states (n = 362, 22.8%), Midwestern states (n = 329, 20.7%), and Western
states (n = 174, 10.9%).
Table 2 presents the profit-motivated police crime arrest cases in terms of the most
serious offense charged in each case. There were 46 separate criminal offense categories
represented as the most serious offense charged in the profit-motivated police crime arrest cases
in years 2005-2011. Most common as the most serious offense charged in the profit-motivated
cases were unclassified thefts (n = 255, 16.0%), false pretenses (known as theft by deception in
Model Penal Code states) (n = 199, 12.5%), drug offenses (n = 189, 11.9%), robbery (n = 103,
6.4%), thefts from buildings (n = 92, 5.8%), and extortion and blackmail (n = 85, 5.3%).
<<<<< Insert Table 2 about here >>>>>
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Victims of Profit-motivated Police Crime
Table 3 presents victim characteristics in profit-motivated police crime arrest cases in
years 2005-2011. Victim information was not ascertainable from the source documents in many
of the profit-motivated police crime arrest cases. Most of the known victims were male (n = 195,
83.3%, valid 73.3%). Almost none of the known victims were children under the age of 18
(valid 98.2% of the known victims were adults age 18 or older). Most of the known victims
were strangers or nonstranger acquaintances (n = 350, 21.9%, valid 93.8 %) to the arrested
officer. Very few of the victims were also police officers, although many of the cases involved
internal crimes against the arrested officer’s employing law enforcement agency (n = 738,
46.4%).
<<<<< Insert Table 3 about here >>>>>
Predicting Conviction in Profit-motivated Police Crime Arrest Cases
The regression models predicted criminal conviction on any offense charged in profitmotivated police crime arrest cases versus non-conviction. Conviction data were available on
over two-thirds of the profit-motivated cases (n = 1,105, 69.5%). Of those cases with known
criminal case outcomes, most of the officers arrested for profit-motivated crimes were convicted
(n = 914, valid 82.7%) on at least one offense charged in the case. Bivariate Chi-Square
associations were statistically significant at the p < .05 level for 49 independent variables and the
dependent variables, conviction on any offense charged. There were six bivariate associations of
moderate strength as indicated by the Cramer’s V scores for the statistically significant ChiSquare statistics. The statistically significant bivariate associations of moderate strength were
the victim’s relationship to the arrested officer, where χ2 (6, N = 266) = 25.017, p < .001, V =
.307; age of the officer at time of arrest, where χ2 (49, N = 1,010) = 85.828, p = .001, V = .292;
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the State where the arrested officer’s employing law enforcement agency was located, where χ2
(47, N = 1,105) = 88.251, p < .001, V = .283; years of service at time of arrest, where χ2 (39, N =
799) = 62.423, p = .010, V = .280; job loss, where χ2 (1, N = 1,105) = 82.094, p < .001, V = .273;
and age as a categorical variable, where χ2 (10, N = 1,105) = 44.496, p < .001, V = .201.
Table 4 presents a backward stepwise binary logistic regression model predicting
conviction in profit-motivated police crime arrest cases. Bivariate correlations computed for
each of the independent variables in the logistic regression model revealed that none of the
variables were highly correlated with each other. Multicollinearity was not a problem as
indicated by no tolerance scores below .696 and no variance inflation factors above 1.436. The
Durbin-Watson score of 1.659 indicated that autocorrelation was not a problem in the model.
Logistic regression results indicated that the overall model of nine predictors was statistically
reliable in distinguishing between conviction and non-conviction in profit-motivated police
crime arrest cases. The model correctly classified 83.8% of the cases (AUC = .593, 95% CI
2
[.547, .639], RROC
= .186). Wald statistics indicated that all of the independent variables in the

binary logistic regression model significantly predicted conviction in profit-motivated police
crime arrest cases.
<<<<< Insert Table 4 about here >>>>>
Odds ratio interpretations provide context for prediction of criminal conviction in profitmotivated police crime arrest cases. The single largest predictor of conviction in the profitmotivated arrest cases was whether the officer’s crime involved a drug-related shakedown. The
simple odds of conviction were 109 times greater if the profit-motivated police crime involved a
drug-related shakedown. Job loss also predicted conviction in profit-motivated police crime
arrest cases. The simple odds of conviction in a profit-motivated case were 23.2 times greater if
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the arrested officer ultimately lost their job (either through involuntary termination or through
voluntary resignation) as the final adverse employment outcome following an officer’s arrest for
a profit-motivated police crime. Violence-related police crime also predicted criminal conviction
in profit-motivated police crime arrest cases. The simple odds of conviction were 4.3 times
higher if an officer’s profit-motivated police crime was also violence-related. The type of
nonfederal law enforcement agency employing the arrested officer and the state where the
employing agency was located also predicted criminal conviction in profit-motivated police
crime arrest cases. The simple odds of conviction in profit-motivated police crime arrest cases
increased by 68% for every one-unit increase in agency type. Agency type was coded using
several categories: (a) primary state police agency, (b) sheriff’s office, (c) county police
department, (d) municipal police department, (e) special police department, (f) constable agency,
(g) tribal police department, and (h) regional police department. As a literal interpretation
(remembering that this variable is a nominal-level measurement), that means as you move away
from primary state police agencies to other types of police departments, the greater the likelihood
of conviction. There is no practical interpretation of the odds ratio for the state where the
officer’s employing nonfederal law enforcement agency was located, other than to note that the
simple odds of conviction in profit-motivated police crime arrest cases varied from state to state
across the country.
Several variables in the logistic regression model predicted when criminal conviction (on
any offense charged in the case against the arrested officer) was less likely. Here, the number of
part-time sworn officers employed by the agency where the arrested officer worked predicted
conviction. The simple odds of conviction went down by 27.2% for every one-unit categorical
increase in the number of part-time sworn officers employed by the agency. The media and
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public perception surrounding an officer’s arrest for profit-motivated police crime also had an
impact on conviction. The simple odds of conviction went down by 96.3% if the arrested
officer’s chief was under scrutiny as a result of the officer’s arrest for a profit-motivated police
crime. Although in the same model profit-motivated police crime arrest cases that involved a
drug-related shakedown increased the simple odds of conviction, drug-related shakedowns in the
form of off-duty robberies decreased the odds of conviction. The simple odds of conviction
decreased by 98.9% if the officer’s profit-motivated police crime arrest case involved a drugrelated shakedown in the form of an off-duty robbery. Finally, the age of the victim in a profitmotivated police crime arrest case predicted the likelihood of conviction. The simple odds of
conviction decreased by 30% for every one-unit categorical increase in the age of the victim in a
profit-motivated police crime arrest case.
Figure 1 presents the CART results of predicting conviction for the profit-motivated
cases and included a total of 1,105 police crime arrest cases. The tree had an overall
2
= .562) and selected the
classification score of 85.2% (AUC = .781, 95% CI [.744, .818], RROC

variable job loss as the splitting criterion. Officers who had not lost their job (node 1) were
convicted in 62.4% of the cases. In contrast, officers who lost their job (node 2) were convicted
in 87.9% of the cases. The officers who had not lost their job in node 1 were partitioned by the
variable year of arrest. Officers who were arrested in years 2005-2006 were convicted in 83.6%
of the cases. Officers who were arrested in years 2007-2009 were convicted in 34.2% of the
cases and officers who were arrested in years 2010- 2011 were convicted in 59.9% of the cases.
The officers who had lost their job in node 2 were partitioned by the variable urban/rural
continuum. Officers were convicted in 79.6% of the cases if employed by agencies located
metropolitan counties or independent cities of 250,000 to 1 million; nonmetropolitan counties or
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independent cities with an urban population of 20,000 or more, not adjacent to a metro area;
counties or independent cities in a metropolitan area with a population of fewer than 250,00,
adjacent to a metropolitan area; or nonmetropolitan counties or independent cities with an urban
population of 20,000 or more, adjacent to a metropolitan area. Officers were convicted in 92.6%
of the cases when employed by a law enforcement agency located in counties or independent
cities within a metropolitan area of 1 million population or more; nonmetropolitan counties or
independent cities with an urban population 2,500 to 19,999, adjacent to a metropolitan area;
nonmetropolitan counties or independent cities with urban population of 2,500 to 19,999, not
adjacent to a metropolitan area; nonmetropolitan counties or independent cities that were
completely rural or less than 2,500 urban population, not adjacent to a metropolitan area;
nonmetropolitan counties or independent cities that were completely rural or less than 2,500
urban population, adjacent to a metropolitan area. The tree also included the following variables
in tier three: drug/narcotic violation, urban/rural continuum, arresting agency, and geographic
region within the United States.
<<<<< Insert Figure 1 about here >>>>>
Discussion
The current study identifies and analyzes almost 1,600 cases in which nonfederal sworn
law enforcement officers across the United States were arrested for one or more profit-motivated
crimes. The data describe how some officers use the power of their position to engage in
personal enrichment or other forms of profit—a phenomenon captured within our title phrase as
an obvious perversion of the well-recognized "protect and serve" motto. The study describes
officers who perpetrate these crimes, the offenses charged in criminal court, and the conditions
under which these behaviors are punished. Some points of discussion emerge from these data.
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Perhaps the most obvious point of discussion concerns the widespread occurrence of
these crimes. Long-standing scholarship focused exclusively on the profit-motivated crimes of
police employed by large urban agencies, specifically those targeted by highly-publicized
commissions created as a mechanism to reform "big-city" corruption. Our research identified
police who committed profit-motivated crimes within the largest urban centers; but also, those
employed within rural locales, small-towns, suburbs, and medium-sized cities. Almost one-fifth
of these cases occurred in nonmetropolitan counties. We believe our data show that profitmotivated police crimes are not uncommon, and that existing assumptions about how rarely these
offenses occur, and more specifically where they occur, need to be questioned. Profit-motivated
police crime cannot be considered a problem exclusive to "big-city" police departments.
Our research also identified the types of criminal offenses that comprise profit-motivated
police crime. This type of police crime most commonly involves some form of nonviolent theft.
The most serious offense charged in roughly 40 percent of the cases was unclassified theft, false
pretenses/swindle, theft from buildings, or embezzlement. Robbery was the most serious offense
charged in only 6.4% of the cases, and only about one in ten of the total number of cases in the
dataset were coded as "violence-related." Most would define the typical profit-motivated police
crime as less serious, and perhaps not worthy of the attention-grabbing headlines commonly
devoted to other forms of police misconduct involving police shootings, sexual violence, or other
forms of assault.
Crimes of violence are logically defined as more serious than thefts and other property
crimes, but perceptions that lead to the definition of profit-motivated police crimes as less
serious run counter to traditional ideas about the importance of police integrity as a source of
legitimacy. These are for the most part police officers who behaved as common thieves; they are
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a disgrace to the badge. Misconceptions about the seriousness of profit-motivated crimes also
threatens to undermine strategies to identify and punish officers who perpetrate them. For
example, officers who perpetrated crimes in our study were arrested by police employed within
an agency other than their own agency in over two-thirds of all the cases. The data do not
specifically identify why the employing agency failed to arrest one of its own in the majority of
cases. The finding does suggest that profit-motivated police crimes may not be a priority within
many agencies, or perhaps that these types of crimes are intentionally ignored or commonly
covered up within at least some agencies. The occurrence of these forms of police crime
presumably weakens public confidence in law enforcement, a situation that potentially
exacerbates conflicts recently sparked by more serious police shootings. Scholarship has
demonstrated that levels of public confidence and support of police sometimes decline sharply in
the aftermath of singular and notorious police-citizen encounters (see, e.g., Weitzer, 2002). The
perpetration of less serious but more common money-making police crimes may quicken or
exacerbate the demise of public confidence in the manner of the colloquial death by a thousand
cuts.
Much of the analyses were dedicated to identifying the circumstances under which these
sorts of crimes are punished. Our findings demonstrate that some forms of profit-motivated
police crime are not likely to be tolerated by the criminal courts where juries (or judges in bench
trials) assigned moral blameworthiness and overwhelmingly convicted officers charged with
certain unseemly crimes, including profit-motivated crimes that involved some form of violence
as well as on-duty police shakedowns of citizens involved in the drug trade. We also found that
courts were more likely to convict an officer of a profit-motivated crime in cases where the
officer had lost his or her job after being arrested. Prior research has shown that police officers
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are likely to be convicted in cases where they lost their jobs after being charged with serious
crimes involving acts of police sexual violence (Stinson, Brewer, Mathna, Liederbach, &
Englebrecht, 2014). Officers are unlikely to be convicted or lose their job, however, when
charged with less serious crimes such as drunk driving or incidents involving acts of officerinvolved domestic violence (Stinson & Liederbach, 2013; Stinson, Liederbach, Brewer, &
Todak, 2014). These findings collectively demonstrate that courts may perceive officers who
commit only certain types of profit-motivated crime as morally blameworthy and particularly
deserving of punishment.
Our research in the longer view may contribute to the eventual construction of conceptual
models and the development of a more complete understanding of the money-making crimes of
police. That is, the substantive issue for scholars and practitioners beyond our specific data and
exploratory analyses remains: why do some police officers perpetrate profit-motivated police
crimes; and, why do these crimes occur within all sorts of police agencies? Conceptual models
to explain the profit-motivated crimes of police should perhaps begin with some understanding
of the long-standing scholarship focused on the similar money-making crimes of white-collar
and corporate offenders. A detailed review of this expansive literature is beyond our present
goals; however, a great deal of scholarship on the motivations of white-collar offenders begins
with classical theory, the concept of greed, and the common assumption that profit-motivated
criminals simply "want to make a fast buck." The primary motivations are believed to
encompass financial self-interests and conventional wisdom relating to the notion that "crime
pays," and that these sorts of behaviors offer white-collar criminals "the easiest way to make a lot
of money" (Coleman, 1992, p. 59, 1995, pp. 362–363). These same motivations also likely
underpin the perpetration of many profit-motivated police crimes. A basic understanding of
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these phenomenon and our data probably begins on the level of individual officers who
surrendered to one of the most powerful human instincts in pursuit of their own self-interest.
Potential theories on profit-motivated police crime that focus too closely on greed,
however, risk losing sight of the proverbial forest for the trees because they obscure the broader
contexts that are known to influence law enforcement organizations and individual sworn
officers whether they patrol urban beats, suburbs, or small towns. Classic scholarship provides
the basis for much of what is known about police deviance and underscores the importance of
both occupational and social forces in understanding police behavior. The occupational context
of police work provides ample opportunities for misconduct including the perpetration of profitmotivated crimes (Goldstein, 1977; Kappeler et al., 1998). Officers in our dataset, for example,
commonly perpetrated thefts and robberies within the context of seemingly legitimate but also
low-visibility encounters that afforded secrecy, including vehicular stops or interactions
involving criminal suspects during pedestrian stops, searches, or arrests. Police in our dataset
also targeted certain residential and commercial properties as burglary targets based on prior
knowledge of their "beat" and an observed lack of capable guardianship. Police work also
provides opportunities to target victims who are vulnerable because they are alone or perceived
to be easy to discredit or likely to be ignored including drug dealers, other criminal suspects, or
regular citizens who are poor or undocumented or do not speak the language.
The occupational context provides criminal opportunities; and, some of the sociological
traits embedded within police culture seem to neutralize potential formal and informal
mechanisms of control. Cultural themes including secrecy and solidarity presumably decrease
the chances that law enforcement officers who have knowledge of and/or witness police crimes
will report them. Some recognized themes within police culture seem to encourage police to
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define some citizens as particularly blameworthy, and hence, deserving of some retaliatory
actions (Bouza, 1990; Crank, 2004; Van Maanen, 1978; Westley, 1970). The situational
contexts involved in some of the profit-motivated crimes within our data could certainly be
considered "retaliatory" and consistent with these themes, particularly the shakedown of drug
dealers or the profit-motivated victimization of prostitutes. Taken together, these occupational
and culturally-derived factors provide a framework to understand how profit-motivated police
crimes occur beyond individual traits or motivation. The perpetrators are not simply greedy;
they are greedy cops whose job provides criminal opportunities and forms of protection
unavailable to regular citizens.
Our data should be considered a beginning rather than end point provided the previous
absence of large available samples of profit-motivated police crimes and systematic studies on
the phenomenon. One reviewer focused on the need for further development of conceptual
models and the impact of tactics associated with the war on drugs and the practice of asset
forfeiture. The suggestion builds on our discussion of occupationally derived opportunities and
encompasses separate lines of research that identify the corrosive influences of various police
strategies including aggressive pedestrian stop and frisk tactics, pretextual vehicular stops, and
police confiscations of alleged proceeds or instruments of criminal activities. These lines of
research describe how some police tactics defined as lawful by the state are subverted in ways
that push ethical boundaries or may ultimately violate civil rights. The media accounts that are
the basis of our data do not often describe how the arrest of an individual officer or group of
officers may be associated with the larger goals of the state or the enforcement strategies of the
police organization, so conclusions in this regard are beyond the scope of our data. The cases
within our dataset are more clear-cut; these are police who were arrested based on probable
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cause to believe they had knowingly engaged in illegal money-making criminal offenses for
personal profit.
Our suggestions for future research instead focus on the need to address some of the more
immediate limitations of our news-based methodology. One limitation is the obvious absence of
information on victim-related variables. Data on victim age and their relationship to the arrested
officer for example were missing for the vast majority of cases in the current study (97% and
76.5% respectively). News organizations generally do not report the names and other personal
identifiers of crime victims. The need to protect victim identity is probably more acute in the
case that the perpetrator is a police officer. The absence of victim information obviously
hampers our understanding of these phenomena, particularly since we suspect that officers target
specific victims based on their perceived vulnerability to profit-motivated crimes. Future
research based on content analysis of news-based videos rather than text may provide additional
victim-related data with regard to these and other types of police crimes. A second limitation is
the comparative absence of situational and place-based data. Scholars have increasingly focused
on the criminology of place in order to advance theory and mitigate a wide range of crimes
(Weisburd, Groff, & Yang, 2012). These approaches have the potential to also increase our
understanding of profit-motivated police crimes through analyses focused on the identification of
crime patterns, the concentration of available criminal opportunities to police, and the degree to
which police perpetrators operate in ways similar to other profit-motivated criminals. Our final
suggestion is based on the need for more individual-level data on the mechanisms that push some
police to commit profit-motivated crimes. Officers may experience a broad range of issues that
could encourage them to engage in money-making crimes such as personal financial insecurity,
the build-up of job-related stress, and/or ongoing exposure to the profit-motivated criminal
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behavior of other police officers. Scholars currently lack any sort of systematic data on the
individual-level motivations of police who perpetrate profit-motivated crimes beyond our
presumptions based on classic theory and conventional wisdom on the operation of greed.
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Table 1. Profit-motivated Police Crime Arrest Cases, 2005-2011: Arrested Officers and Employing Agencies (N = 1,591)
n
(%)
n
(%)
Sex
Male
Female
Age
19-23
24-27
28-31
32-35
36-39
40-43
44-47
48-51
52-55
56 or older
Missing
Years of Service
0-2
3-5
6-8
9-11
12-14
15-17
18-20
21-23
24-26
27 or more years
Missing
Arresting Agency
Employing Agency
Another Agency

1,497
94

(94.1)
(5.9)

24
137
207
233
244
231
144
90
48
62
171

(1.5)
(8.6)
(13.0)
(14.6)
(15.3)
(14.5)
(9.1)
(5.7)
(3.0)
(3.9)
(10.8)

148
197
162
155
126
104
111
55
25
43
465

(9.3)
(12.4)
(10.2)
(9.7)
(7.9)
(6.5)
(7.0)
(3.5)
(1.6)
(2.7)
(29.2)

510
1,081

(32.1)
(67.9)

Officer Duty Status
On-Duty
Off-Duty

1,093
498

(68.7)
(31.3)

Rank
Officer
Detective
Corporal
Sergeant
Lieutenant
Captain
Major
Colonel
Deputy Chief
Chief

1,132
111
25
141
42
18
5
2
18
97

(71.2)
(7.0)
(1.6)
(8.9)
(2.6)
(1.1)
(0.3)
(0.1)
(1.1)
(6.1)

Function
Patrol & Street Level
Line/Field Supervisor
Management

1,243
208
140

(78.1)
(13.1)
(8.8)

362
329
726
174

(22.8)
(20.7)
(45.6)
(10.9)

1,312
279

(82.5)
(17.5)

Region of United States
Northeastern States
Midwestern States
Southern States
Western States
Level of Rurality
Metropolitan County
Non-Metro County

n

(%)

62
251
66
1,162
42
7
1
0

(3.9)
(15.8)
(4.2)
(73.0)
(2.6)
(0.4)
(0.1)
(0.0)

Full-Time Sworn Officers
0
1
2-4
5-9
10-24
25-49
50-99
100-249
250-499
500-999
1,000 or more

7
16
67
77
176
152
167
169
161
104
495

(0.4)
(1.0)
(4.2)
(4.9)
(11.1)
(9.6)
(10.5)
(10.6)
(10.1)
(6.5)
(31.1)

Part-Time Sworn Officers
0
1
2-4
5-9
10-24
25-49
50-99
100-249
250-499

1,209
46
104
111
94
19
6
1
1

(76.)
(2.9)
(6.5)
(7.0)
(5.9)
(1.2)
(0.3)
(0.1)
(0.1)

Agency Type
Primary State Police
Sheriff's Office
County Police Dept.
Municipal Police Dept.
Special Police Dept.
Constable
Tribal Police Dept.
Regional Police Dept.
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Table 2. Most Serious Offense Charged in Profit-motivated Police Crime Arrest Cases, 2005-2011 (N = 1,591)
n
(%)
Unclassified Theft / Larceny
False Pretenses / Swindle
Drug / Narcotic violation
Robbery
Theft from Building
Extortion / Blackmail
Embezzlement
Burglary / Breaking & Entering
Bribery
All Other Offenses
False Report / False Statement
Weapons Law violation
Counterfeiting / Forgery
Stolen Property Offenses
Shoplifting
Official Misconduct / Oppression / Violation of Oath
Civil Rights violation
Intimidation
Theft from Motor Vehicle
Arson
Impersonation
Obstruction of Justice
Aggravated Assault

255
199
189
103
92
85
77
72
56
49
46
40
39
38
31
29
26
21
21
16
14
11
10

(16.0)
(12.5)
(11.9)
(6.4)
(5.8)
(5.3)
(4.8)
(4.5)
(3.5)
(3.1)
(2.9)
(2.5)
(2.5)
(2.4)
(1.9)
(1.8)
(1.6)
(1.3)
(1.3)
(1.0)
(0.9)
(0.7)
(0.6)

Wire Fraud
Gambling: Operating / Promoting
Simple Assault
Motor Vehicle Theft
Credit Card Fraud / ATM Fraud
Murder & Nonnegligent Manslaughter
Assisting or Promoting Prostitution
Evidence: Destroying / Tampering
Gambling: Betting / Wagering
Theft of Motor Vehicle Parts / Accessories
Kidnapping / Abduction
Unclassified Sex Crime
Welfare Fraud
Pocket-Picking
Theft from a Coin-operated Machine
Prostitution
Forcible Sodomy
Forcible Fondling
Bad Checks
Disorderly Conduct
Family Offenses, nonviolent
Liquor Law violation
Wiretapping, illegal

n

(%)

9
9
7
7
6
5
4
4
3
3
2
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

(0.6)
(0.6)
(0.4)
(0.4)
(0.4)
(0.3)
(0.3)
(0.3)
(0.2)
(0.2)
(0.1)
(0.1)
(0.1)
(0.1)
(0.1)
(0.1)
(0.1)
(0.1)
(0.1)
(0.1)
(0.1)
(0.1)
(0.1)
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Table 3. Victim Characteristics in Profit-motivated Police Crime Arrest Cases, 2005-2011 (N = 1,591)
n
(%) (Valid %)
Victim's Sex
Female
Male
Missing

71
195
1,325

(4.4)
(83.3)
(16.7)

(26.7)
(73.3)

Victim's Age
Birth-11
12-13
14-15
16-17
18-19
20-24
25-32
33-41
42 or older
Missing

0
1
0
2
1
9
11
9
13
1,545

(0.0)
(0.1)
(0.0)
(0.1)
(0.1)
(0.6)
(0.7)
(0.6)
(0.8)
(97.0)

(0.0)
(2.2)
(0.0)
(4.3)
(2.2)
(19.5)
(24.0)
(19.5)
(28.3)

n

(%)

(Valid %)

Victim's Relationship
Current Spouse
Former Spouse
Current Girlfriend or Boyfriend
Former Girlfriend or Boyfriend
Child or Stepchild
Some Other Relative
Unrelated Child
Stranger or Acquaintance
Missing

1
4
1
6
0
5
6
350
1,218

(0.1)
(0.3)
(0.1)
(0.4)
(0.0)
(0.3)
(0.4)
(21.9)
(76.5)

(0.3)
(1.1)
(0.3)
(1.6)
(0.0)
(1.3)
(1.6)
(93.8)

Victim's Law Enforcement Status
Victim is Not a Police Officer
Victim is a Police Officer
Missing

358
12
1,221

(22.5)
(0.8)
(76.7)

(96.8)
(3.2)

Victim Adult or Child
Adult
Child
Missing

374
7
1,210

(23.5)
(0.4)
(76.1)

(98.2)
(1.8)
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Table 4. Profit-motivated Police Crime Arrest Cases: Logistic Regression Model Predicting Conviction (N = 197)
95% CI for Exp(B)
B

SE

Wald

p

Exp(B)

LL

UL

Type of Agency

0.519

0.224

5.381

.020

1.681

1.084

2.606

State

0.070

0.020

12.566

< .001

1.073

1.032

1.115

-0.318

0.160

3.931

.047

0.728

0.532

0.996

1.666

0.732

5.177

.023

5.292

1.260

22.234

Part-time Sworn Personnel (categorical)
Violence-related
Officer's Chief is Under Scrutiny

-3.293

1.398

5.549

.018

0.037

0.002

0.575

Drugs: Shakedown / Theft from Off-duty Robbery

-4.517

2.035

4.927

.026

0.011

0.000

0.589

4.702

1.648

8.141

.004

110.177

4.358

2785.279

3.187

0.679

22.041

< .001

24.216

6.401

91.605

-0.357

0.123

8.439

.004

0.700

0.550

0.890

Drugs: Any Shakedown / Theft
Job Lost
Victim Age Categorical
- 2 Log Likelihood

133.494

Model Chi-Square

82.984

Cox & Snell R
Nagelkerke R
ROC R
AUC

2

2

2

<.001

.344
.516

95% CI for AUC

.186

LL

.593

UL
.547

.639
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Figure 1. Profit-motivated Arrest Cases: CART Model Predicting Conviction
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